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ABSTRACT Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) of 228 isolates was used to elucidate the origin and dynamics of a long-term out-
break of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) sequence type 228 (ST228) SCCmec I that involved 1,600 patients
in a tertiary care hospital between 2008 and 2012. Combining of the sequence data with detailed metadata on patient admission
andmovement confirmed that the outbreak was due to the transmission of a single clonal variant of ST228, rather than repeated
introductions of this clone into the hospital. We note that this clone is significantly more frequently recovered from groin and
rectal swabs than other clones (P< 0.0001) and is also significantly more transmissible between roommates (P< 0.01). Unrec-
ognizedMRSA carriers, together with movements of patients within the hospital, also seem to have played a major role. These
atypical colonization and transmission dynamics can help explain how the outbreak was maintained over the long term. This
“stealthy” asymptomatic colonization of the gut, combined with heightened transmissibility (potentially reflecting a role for
environmental reservoirs), means the dynamics of this outbreak share some properties with enteric pathogens such as
vancomycin-resistant enterococci or Clostridium difficile.
IMPORTANCE Using whole-genome sequencing, we showed that a large and prolonged outbreak of methicillin-resistant Staphy-
lococcus aureus was due to the clonal spread of a specific strain with genetic elements adapted to the hospital environment. Un-
recognizedMRSA carriers, the movement of patients within the hospital, and the low detection with clinical specimens were also
factors that played a role in this occurrence. The atypical colonization of the gut means the dynamics of this outbreak may share
some properties with enteric pathogens.
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Hospital-associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus(HA-MRSA) remains a key public health challenge. In addi-
tion to prevention policies, effective programs of infection control
rely on early detection and effective containment. However, hos-
pital outbreaks of HA-MRSA remain commonplace, and new out-
break clones emerge regularly (1–3). The underlying risk factors
are both extrinsic (i.e., relating to infection control procedures,
opportunities for transmission, and the hospital environment)
and intrinsic (i.e., relating to the properties of the bacteria). In
terms of extrinsic factors, many aspects of the hospital setting can
impact transmission, including compliance with infection control
measures, patients’ comorbidities, bed occupancy, and the num-
ber of nurses per patient (4, 5). As for intrinsic factors, strains have
been identified by a heightened ability to be transmitted on na-
tional (6) and/or international (7) scales, although the genetic
basis of this trait is poorly understood (8, 9).
Classical molecular typing such as pulsed-field gel electropho-
resis or targeted sequence-based methods (e.g., spa typing, double
locus sequence typing [DLST]) have been used for the last three
decades to investigate outbreaks and are described as “highly dis-
criminatory.” However, isolates from a predominant clone ob-
tained in different countries could often not be differentiated;
thus, it was not possible to infer whether outbreaks arose through
multiple introductions of the predominant clone or from a single
point source. Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) promises to
make a significant contribution to infection control through un-
ambiguously defining outbreak isolates within a single hospital
and even potentially providing the means to reconstruct transmis-
sion pathways (10–14). However, current studies have focused on
short-term outbreaks persisting over the course of several weeks
or months. In contrast, our tertiary care hospital experienced a
4-year outbreak between 2008 and 2012 that affected over 1,600
patients and was due to the HA-MRSA sequence type 228 (ST228)
SCCmec I clone (9). This clone is common in central Europe, is
also called the southern German or Italian clone, and has been
present in our hospital since the year 2000 (15). Classical epide-
miological typing was not sufficiently powerful to determine if this
outbreak was due to the dissemination of a single strain or if it
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resulted from multiple introductions. Another objective was to
reconstruct the transmission pathways within the hospital in or-
der to help optimize future infection control strategies. In the
present study, we characterize the course of this outbreak by com-
bining whole-genome sequence data with detailed epidemiologi-
cal and clinical data. Our analyses point to a role of intrinsic prop-
erties of the clone, specifically a propensity for asymptomatic
carriage and heightened transmission, in maintaining the out-
break.
RESULTS
Description of the outbreak. Before the outbreak (2005 to 2007),
the mean incidence of newly identified MRSA patients per 1,000
admissions was 8.1. Half of them were identified more than 48 h
after admission, among whom 63% harbored the predominant
clone ST105-SCCmec II. Since September 2008, an increasing
number of new cases was observed, most belonging to ST228-I.
The highest incidence was reached in April 2010, and the inci-
dence then decreased (Fig. 1). The annual number of cases per
1,000 admissions increased to 26.6 in 2010, among which 73%
were identified48 h after admission (hospital onset). In parallel,
from 2007 to 2010, the proportion of MRSA strains among clinical
S. aureus isolates increased from 12% to 23%, and the annual
number of MRSA bacteremia increased from 20 to 46 episodes. A
low-level resistance (LLR) to mupirocin (mean MIC, 25 mg/liter)
was identified as a distinguishing phenotype of this epidemic
strain. This resistance was rarely found in other clones and thus
provided a useful marker to monitor the outbreak.
Reinforcement of infection control measures. This outbreak
led to reinforcement of infection control measures, including re-
current information and training and observations of health care
workers (HCWs). Procedures for decontamination of the pa-
tient’s environment were reinforced, and additional staff was ded-
icated to this task. A PCR-based rapid screening test for MRSA was
introduced in June 2009, allowing reduction in mean turnaround
time to 6.75 h from 57 h for negative cultures and 85 h for positive
culture (data not shown). This rapid test was used for screening
roommates and all patients admitted to or leaving the intensive
care units (ICUs). When 2 or more new cases were observed in the
same unit over the course of a single week, weekly screenings by
culture of all patients were performed until 2 weeks passed with-
out any new cases. In addition, all patients leaving such a unit were
screened by PCR. Patients in units hosting 2 or more MRSA car-
riers were screened on a weekly basis. Since the introduction of
this measure (October 2010), a marked decrease in new cases has
been observed (Fig. 1).
Screening of HCWs. In order to identify any putative super
spreaders among HCWs, intensive screenings were performed
during the first part of the outbreak (September 2008 to January
2009). A total of 511 HCWs were screened, among whom 17
(3.3%) carried MRSA. Only one harbored an isolate belonging to
the ST228 clone that expressed LLR to mupirocin. This person was
found positive in January 2009, followed one decolonization pro-
cedure, and was considered decolonized after three consecutive
negative screening cultures at intervals of several weeks.
Transmissibility. From January to May 2009, a systematic re-
view of roommate screenings following the detection of new
MRSA patients showed a significantly higher proportion of posi-
tive roommates with the ST228 clone (24/216 [11.1%]) than was
the case with the formerly predominant ST105-II clone (8/116
[6.9%]; P 0.002).
Sites of colonization. From January to May 2009, results of
screening sites of 184 new carriers were reviewed (114 with ST228,
70 with other clones). Groin samples were significantly more often
FIG 1 Annual incidence of MRSA cases in the University Hospital of Lausanne according to sequence type (ST) during the period 2004 to 2014. NT, not
typed.
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positive (80.7%) in patients harboring the ST228 clone than in
patients with other clones (50%; P 0.0001). This led us to inves-
tigate colonization of the gut by MRSA. Between October 2009
and February 2010, a rectal swab was performed in 201 new MRSA
carriers with their approval. Among ST228 carriers, 70% (113/
162) had positive rectal swabs, compared to 49% (19/39) for car-
riers of the other clones (P 0.01).
Whole-genome sequencing.Two hundred twenty-eight of the
237 isolates selected for WGS analysis were successfully se-
quenced. Mobile genetic elements (MGEs) were removed from
the alignment, to leave only the core genome (n 2,348 genes). A
total of 1,565 single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) positions
were recorded among all ST228 isolates from this study. Among
these, 1,250 were in genes (316 synonymous, 892 nonsynony-
mous, and 42 nonsense). The SNPs were evenly distributed
throughout the genes, with the exception of five genes showing a
significantly higher number of positions (see Text S1 in the sup-
plemental material). Among these were two genes (fnbB and clfB)
coding for surface proteins involved in pathogenicity and viru-
lence.
Investigation of the beginning of the outbreak. In 2008, 80
patients were colonized or infected with ST228. Isolates were
available for 76 of them and were analyzed by WGS. The maxi-
mum likelihood tree of these isolates reconstructed from the core
SNPs discriminated two major clusters (Fig. 2). Most isolates in
cluster 1 were collected before the outbreak or were from readmit-
ted patients previously known to be MRSA carriers. The diversity
within this cluster was relatively high (pairwise SNP differences:
mean, 35; range, 11 to 56), with no evidence of direct transmission
between patients from whom these isolates were recovered. Con-
versely, isolates within cluster 2 showed very low diversity, with a
maximum of 3 SNP differences. Between these 2 clusters, inter-
mediate isolates could be observed. One outlier (no. 233) (Fig. 2)
was isolated from a patient transferred from a hospital in Mace-
donia, a country where ST228 is known to be prevalent (15).
WGS data confirmed the outbreak started with the index case
on 3 September, as no patient was found to harbor an isolate from
cluster 2 before this date. The outbreak started in the septic sur-
gery ward. After the first patient was identified, 7 additional pa-
tients were found positive in this ward. These 8 patients had been
FIG 2 Phylogenetic evidence of a clonal spread of ST228 isolates in 2008 in the University Hospital of Lausanne. Shown is a maximum likelihood tree based on
SNP variable sites of ST228 isolates (1 per patient), annotated with the isolate number. The scale bar represents the number of substitutions per SNP site. Most
isolates in cluster 1 were collected before the outbreak or were from readmitted patients previously known to be MRSA carriers. Isolates within cluster 2 showed
very low diversity (0 to 3 SNPs) suggesting direct transmission. Isolates susceptible to mupirocin are in green, those with low-level resistance to mupirocin (base
mutation G¡T in the ileS gene) are in black, and those with high-level resistance (presence of the mupA gene) are in red. Isolates showing the absence of the qac
gene are surrounded by a blue square. Bootstrap values are shown in italic below each branch.
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hospitalized for 14 to 45 days prior to MRSA identification and
were therefore unrecognized carriers with many opportunities for
transmission. Epidemiological data did not allow the identifica-
tion of the source patient.
Given the very low level of diversity within cluster 2 (53 iso-
lates), the WGS data provide powerful evidence as to which iso-
lates were likely to be epidemiologically linked or unlinked to the
outbreak. Four isolates did not belong to cluster 2 and were prob-
ably epidemiologically unlinked with the outbreak isolates. In
contrast, three patients screened on admission, and hence not
suspected to be carrying the outbreak variant, harbored isolates
that were identical to the index isolate. On further investigation,
all three patients had previous hospital stays in units where the
epidemic strain was present.
Network visualization of patients harboring the outbreak
clone. A network analysis based on overlapping periods of hospi-
talization for each patient harboring an outbreak strain in the
early stages of the outbreak (September through December 2008)
is presented in Fig. 3. Each square node represents a patient. Pairs
of patients are linked if they shared at least 1 day in the same
unit/ward. In addition to the 53 patients found to harbor the out-
break strain (i.e., those with isolates in cluster 2), we also included
an additional four patients who harbored ST228 isolates for which
WGS was not available but were very likely to be part of the out-
break on the basis of DLST data and LLR to mupirocin. This
analysis revealed two densely linked groups of patients that corre-
spond to the first (septic surgery [nodes colored red in Fig. 3]) and
the third (ear nose and throat [ENT; colored yellow]) units where
the outbreak started, whereas the second ward (ICU2 [dark
green]) showed only sparse links.
This confirms our hypothesis that the strain had plenty of time
to disseminate from the septic surgery and ENT wards. Moreover,
the second unit (ICU2) where the outbreak occurred did not seem
to have as many links as the other two, indicating that this ICU
played a more minor role in the dissemination of the outbreak
strain than was considered likely during the course of the out-
break. Notably, for seven patients (12%) there was no clear epide-
miological link that could explain acquisition of the outbreak
strain based on overlapping stays on a given ward.
Investigation of the period from 2008 to 2012. We then re-
constructed a maximum likelihood tree that includes all isolates
from 2008 to 2012 (Fig. 4). This analysis confirmed that the whole
outbreak was due to the clonal spread of a single variant. During
this 52-month period, 7 distinct branches (a to g in Fig. 4 and 5)
diversified over time. None of these branches were associated with
a specific ward; instead, they were observed in many different
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wards (see Text S1 in the supplemental material). Figure 6 illus-
trates the context of the orthopedic ward, where the outbreak
lasted several months. During this period, patients with isolates
belonging to 5 of these branches were identified, suggesting that at
least on five occasions unrecognized MRSA patients were admit-
ted to this ward. WGS data showed that new MRSA patients were
not only due to transmissions within the ward but also to admis-
sion of unrecognized MRSA patients.
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We note that isolate no. 188 is divergent compared to the other
isolates of the outbreak and is situated on the end of a long branch
(branch b in Fig. 4). While this branch length could be indicative
of a hypermutator, we found no mutation in the mutL or mutS
genes involved in hypermutability (10, 16).
Calculating the rate of diversification of the outbreak clone.
We then examined the rate at which diversification of the ST228
variant accrued over the course of the outbreak. We computed the
total number of SNPs present within each cluster 2 isolate com-
pared to the index isolate and plotted this against the date on
which each isolate was recovered (Fig. 5). There is a clear positive
correlation of genetic divergence with sampling date of isolates,
reflecting the accumulation of SNPs over time. The linear regres-
sion line (excluding isolate no. 188 [described above]) showed a
slope of 0.016 SNP per day (1 SNP every 8.9 weeks). Thus, the
finding of two identical isolates from different patients suggests
that a transmission event is likely to have occurred at some point
within the 9 weeks prior to sampling. Considering the size of the
N315 genome (2,814,816 nucleotides [nt]) and the size of sub-
tracted MGE (210,244 nt), a mutation rate of 2.2  106 substi-
tutions per nucleotide site per year was estimated.
Genetic determinants of resistance of interest.The WGS data
showed that all isolates from cluster 2 showed the G¡T mutation
in the ileS gene conferring LLR to mupirocin (Fig. 2 and 4); thus,
this resistance phenotype has been clonally inherited during the
outbreak. Fourteen of the 25 (56%) ST228 isolates that did not
belong to cluster 2, and hence were epidemiologically unlinked to
the outbreak, also exhibited this mutation, although it is rarely
observed in other clones. In contrast, the presence of the mupA
gene, located on a plasmid and responsible for the high-level re-
sistance (HLR), was observed in 14 isolates representing different
branches within cluster 2 (Fig. 4). This points to multiple inde-
pendent acquisitions of the plasmid over the course of the out-
break. All of the outbreak isolates except 5 showed the presence of
the qac gene by PCR (Fig. 2 and 4).
DISCUSSION
We combined whole-genome sequencing with detailed metadata
to investigate an outbreak of MRSA involving over 1,600 patients
in a tertiary care hospital during a 4-year period. To our knowl-
edge, this is the largest-scale outbreak in a single hospital that has
yet been characterized using WGS. The WGS data clearly demon-
strated that this large outbreak was due to the spread of a single
clonal variant of ST228. The genome data are broadly consistent
with the epidemiological data in that the earliest outbreak isolate
(the index isolate) sequenced was recovered in September 2008,
which is when the outbreak began. The data also confirm the
septic surgery ward and the ENT ward as the sites where the out-
break originated in the hospital, but network analysis of patient
movement suggests that one ICU played a smaller role in propa-
gating the outbreak during the early stages than was assumed at
the time.
The identification of an index isolate means that it is possible to
calculate the rate of mutation accumulation over the course of the
outbreak, simply by plotting the number of SNPs of each outbreak
isolate relative to the index isolate against the time of recovery.
Our estimate of 2.2  106 SNPs per genome per year is highly
consistent with previous estimates (1.3  106 to 3.3  106)
(17–20). This equates to an average about 1 SNP every 9 weeks,
meaning that the WGS data probably do not have sufficient dis-
crimination to resolve multiple transmission events occurring
over shorter time frames than this. The best we can do, therefore,
over the short term is to identify groups of patients who cohabited
the same ward at overlapping times and harbored identical iso-
lates and infer in such cases that the data are consistent with trans-
mission events having occurred between these patients. It is nota-
ble that for 12% of isolates, there is no consistency between patient
movement and genome data. The acquisition of the outbreak
strain in these cases could therefore have occurred from an HCW
(which is not very likely, given that only one HCW was found to be
FIG 5 Root-to-tip genetic distances of isolates from the outbreak strain. The total number of SNPs present within each isolate compared to that in the index
isolate was computed and plotted against the date on which each isolate was recovered. The color and the shape of the dots are according to the 7 branches
observed during the diversification of the strain (Fig. 4).
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colonized with the isolate) or possibly from an environmental
source or unrecognized MRSA patients.
The WGS data for the latter stages of the outbreak confirm the
spread of a single clonal variant of ST228. The prolonged outbreak
yielded to the diversification of the strain into at least 7 recogniz-
able branches. In most of the wards, isolates from more than one
branch were observed. This means that unrecognized MRSA car-
riers were admitted to these wards and that newly detected MRSA
patients were not only due to transmissions within the ward. For
instance, in the orthopedic ward, the infection control team did
not understand why the spread of the clone could not be con-
trolled. WGS analysis showed that unknown MRSA carriers were
probably constantly admitted to this ward (Fig. 6). Movements of
such patients must have played a key role in the spread and con-
tinuance of this outbreak. This hypothesis is corroborated by the
observation of a decline in the outbreak after implementation of a
weekly screening of all patients.
Many long-term asymptomatic carriers might have been un-
recognized, which would have provided ample opportunities for
“stealthy” transmission. Of note, the first eight patients had been
hospitalized for 14 to 45 days prior to positive screening. In our
setting, the 5-bed rooms were found to be the epicenter of the
spread in many wards. Within these rooms, patients shared facil-
ities and had social contacts that could have favored the transmis-
sion of the strain. We observed that the infection control strategy
was globally insufficient to avoid new transmissions, and several
measures were progressively introduced or reinforced. The role of
unknown colonized patients is supported by the fact that the fad-
ing of the outbreak started after systematic screening was imple-
mented (weekly in units with hospitalized MRSA patients, on ICU
admission and discharge, and at discharge in units where the
strain was spreading). Indirect transmission via the environment
might have also played a role, but we have no data to support this
hypothesis. Nevertheless, reinforcement of disinfection of the vi-
cinity of the patients was one of the first control measures that
were introduced.
Another characteristic of the strain was its propensity for en-
teric colonization. To our knowledge, this is the first time such an
association has been reported for a specific strain in comparison
with others. Among MRSA carriers, the rate of gastrointestinal
colonization was reported to vary from 11 to 89% (21–25). Enteric
carriage may lead to a greater contamination of the environment,
thus favoring transmission (26–28). This feature might have
played a role in the spread of our epidemic strain and would ex-
plain why the ST228 outbreak clone appeared to be more trans-
missible between roommates than other hospital-acquired MRSA
clones. Moreover, adaptation to enteric carriage would change the
dynamics of the outbreak to more closely resemble enteric patho-
gens such as vancomycin-resistant enterococci or Clostridium dif-
ficile. Detailed WGS-based studies on C. difficile have revealed that
only a minority of cases can be explained through direct transmis-
sion from other patients, implicating a role for environmental
reservoirs.
The low-level resistance (LLR) to mupirocin and the presence
of the qac gene might also have played a role in the dissemination
of the outbreak. LLR is usually the result of base mutations in the
native isoleucyl RNA synthetase (IleS) gene which belonged to the
core genome (29). High-level resistance (HLR) is mostly due to
the acquisition of the plasmid-mediated mupA gene, which en-
codes a novel isoleucyl RNA synthetase (30, 31). The widespread
use of intranasal mupirocin ointment for the decolonization of
MRSA has raised concerns about resistance (32). The association
between clinical use of mupirocin and emergence of resistance is
not clear. In the present outbreak, next-generation sequencing
results showed that the mutation conferring LLR to mupirocin
had a clonal spread. In our hospital, this antibiotic was restricted
to MRSA decolonization. Thus, the majority of the patients were
not exposed before being colonized with MRSA. Conversely, the
presence of isolates expressing HLR to mupirocin at the root of
cluster 2 and in different branches (Fig. 4) suggests multiple ac-
quisition of the plasmid containing the mupA gene during the
outbreak.
The qac genes not only codes for resistance to quaternary am-
monium compounds but also codes for resistance to a broad spec-
trum of other cationic compounds, such as chlorhexidine, via an
efflux-based pump (33). Considering the wide use of chlorhexi-
dine in the hospital, the presence of the qac genes in an MRSA
clone could contribute to its adaptation in this setting. We previ-
ously showed that the qac genes in ST228 strains from our hospital
were located on a plasmid closely related to the plasmid SAP064A
(9), and the present study showed that the majority of ST228 iso-
lates harbored these genes. This suggests that these genes are asso-
ciated with the ST228 lineage. Together, resistances to mupirocin
and chlorhexidine might have played a role in the dissemination
of the clone in our hospital.
Several studies reported nosocomial MRSA outbreaks with
clear molecular and epidemiological evidence of MRSA transmis-
sion from HCWs to patients (34, 35). In our setting, one HCW was
found to harbor the ST228 clone. The isolate has not been se-
quenced, but its LLR to mupirocin (data not shown) is consistent
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with it being the outbreak variant. Due to confidentiality policy in
our hospital, we did not have access to administrative data from
the HCW screened for MRSA and could not assess if he/she took
care of a limited or a large number of patients. Nevertheless, the
fact that decolonization was successful and that the outbreak con-
tinued suggest a transient colonization that probably did not play
a major role in the dissemination of the epidemic strain.
In conclusion, we showed that this large outbreak was due to
the clonal spread of a specific strain with genetic elements adapted
to the hospital environment. However, other factors were proba-
bly necessary for this occurrence, such as the long period of hos-
pitalization of unrecognized MRSA carriers at the beginning of the
outbreak and the low detection with clinical specimens. Under
these circumstances, intensifying the screening of hospitalized pa-
tients for earlier detection of carriers together with increasing dis-
infection of the patient environment were the actions that proba-
bly had the greatest impact on the outbreak.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Setting. The University Hospital of Lausanne is a 1,000-bed tertiary care
hospital where active screening for high-risk patients was part of the
MRSA control strategy. Screening for MRSA was performed by culture,
and at least one isolate per patient was genotyped. (For more details, see
Text S1 in the supplemental material.)
Study period.The outbreak started in September 2008, reached a peak
in 2010, and faded in November 2010. The study period was extended
from January 2008 to December 2012.
WGS. In assembling the strain collection for sequencing, we sampled
deeply from the early stages of the outbreak in 2008 and sequenced the
first isolate recovered from all patients either infected or shown to be
carriers, including new cases and readmitted patients known to carry this
clone (n 80). For the period from 2009 to 2012, one isolate from every
10th consecutive patient was selected for WGS analysis, and only new
cases were considered (n 157).
Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) was performed as previously de-
scribed (14) (For more details, see Text S1 in the supplemental material.)
Detection of resistance genes of interest. Previous analysis of ST228
isolates with microarrays revealed the presence of qac genes (36). These
were found to be located on a conjugative plasmid and code for resistance
to cationic biocides via a relatively low-specificity efflux pump (33). A
PCR assay for this gene was performed on all isolates selected for WGS
analysis as previously described (37). The presence of the mupA gene,
responsible for high-level resistance to mupirocin, was determined by a
PCR assay performed as previously described (38). Low-level resistance
(LLR) to mupirocin is usually the result of a single-base mutation (G¡T)
in the native isoleucyl RNA synthetase (IleS) gene. This mutation, situated
at position 1173071 in the N315 reference genome, was searched for in all
mapped sequences.
Network analysis of patients’ movements during their hospitaliza-
tion. Ward, unit, and room number in and out dates of hospitalization
were retrieved from the informatics system of the hospital. Patients were
considered to have acquired MRSA after the date of the last negative
screening (if applicable), and onward transmission was assumed to be
unlikely after the report of the first positive sample as additional contact
measures were then taken. These dates were obtained from the laboratory
information system. A MATLAB script was written to calculate the num-
ber of days each pair of patients spent in the same location having the
opportunity to transmit MRSA. The ward was considered the geographi-
cal location, except for large wards (medical, surgery, and ICUs), for
which the unit was considered. The data matrix was visualized using the
software NetDraw version 2.139 (39).
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
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